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This paper describes an experiment conducted as part of a wider study of cog-
nitive style. The underlying paradigm is briefly outlined together with the method-
olgy used to classify individuals style. The results of a series of experiments ex-
amining the implications of cognitive style are summarized; these focus on career
preferences and personality factors.
The body of the paper describes an experiment using a distinctive, small sample
of student subjects, which examines in detail the processes of problem-solving. The
experiment focuses on the relation between cognitive style and:
a) problem-choice and performance
b) strategies of problem-solving
c) characteristics of verbalization and structure of argument
Some generalizations (and speculations) are drawn from the experiments concerning
aspects of management practice where differences in cognitive style seem especially
important:
a) communication and mutual understanding
b) the design of work teams
c) the design and use of decision aids, especially computer-based models.

I . Introduction
Most people are fully aware of the degree to which personality affects behavior,
J
and in dealing with other people we generally take differences in character into ac-
count. On the whole, we also show tolerance for those differences without necessarily
insisting that our own personality is the "right" one. In organizations, groups and
marriages, people invest substantial effort in learning to understand and accept .
each other in this way. By contrast, we seem much less tolerant of other people's j
ways of thinking. Perhaps we have, for too long, been taught that thinking should be
"logical": this implies some single desirable style of thought, marked by rigor, j
precision, and method. Certainly, when we reach a solution to some problem, our an- i
swer is "right" in our own terms; it is the outcome of a process in which we assess
evidence and prove a case. We communicate to others in terms of that evidence and |
proof. In management decision-making, this view of thinking has been reinforced by il
the distinctly rationalistic approach of most management science techniques ( and, on
a theoretical level, by the Carnegie School of Research under Cyert, March, and Simon,"
which has been perhaps the most dominating influence on modem theories of decision-
making) . A complex OR model , which rigorously defines all the features of a problem ,
and structures a method for analyzing them, is a substitute for or analogue of the
manager's own problem-solving, cind is more efficient and more effective in many in-
stances, (eg. linear programming solutions for distribution problems); it is very
easy for quantitative specialists to argue therefore that the style of thinking implied
by the model is a "best" one towards which a manager should aim. Though the manager
may counter this by pointing to the very real limitations of OR techniques in certain
circumstances, he is still likely to agree that his job requires some distinct methods
of problem-solving and that anything else is unsuitable and even undesirable.
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In recent years, the term "cognitive style" has appeared with increasing frequen-
cy in management literature, to the extent that it now constitutes a definite
if small left-wing fringe in management science circles and is part of the convention-
al wisdom in more behavioral areas. The concept of cognitive "style" runs directly
counter to much of the technical tradition mentioned above. It argues that there is
no single right way of thinking, but that, as with personality in general, there are
a range of strategies, habits, and abilities that all have value in particular circum-
stances. Competent individuals learn to build on their strengths and gravitate to pos-
itions where there is some fit between their cognitive style and the demands of their
job - i.e. their style is such that they are comfortable as well as capable in pro-
cessing the information and reaching the decisions involved in their work.
It is easy to outline the implications of cognitive style for decision-making,
much less easy to develop reliable classifications of style. The whole field of cog-
nitive theory is marked by a set of competing taxonomies which try to capture some
very elusive processes in a simple conceptual scheme. This paper presents an ex-
periment which uses a particular paradigm of cognitive style, but the aim is to estab-
lish a perspective rather than to justify that model. The experiment focuses on the
process of problem-solving rather than on performance in obtaining correct solutions.
One of the reasons we may overlook the degree and impact of differences in thinking
styles is that we generally do emphasize answers rather than the processes leading to
them. In academic tests, particularly those measuring IQ, each problem has only one
answer, but in complex management functions in marketing and corporate planning, this
is clearly not so; in the IQ test, the problem and the unique answer implicitly con-
strain process, but in more open ended problems, such as trying to forecast shifts in
taste in men's fashions, the particular approach and direction of the manager may well
determine what answers can be arrived at. The problems dealt with by the subjects in
this experiment were designed to be a cognitive Rorschach - a set of very open-ended
questions with no visibly correct answer; this allowed the subject to respond in any

-3-
way he wished and thus highlighted his idiosyncratic strategies and approach.
The experiment is part of a larger study of cognitive style. It involves
20 subjects whose performance on a set of tests given to 150 MBA students indic-
ated a very distinct cognitive style. This sample is not representative, either of
students or decision-makers. (The statement that psychology is 'the study of sopho-
mores' is fair criticism.) The students do, however, intend to become business mana-
gers and have substantial work experience. In addition, the overall results of the
tests they took correspond fairly closely with those of 100 middle-level managers. It
would be very foolish indeed to claim that any of the experiments in the main study
from which this one is taken can be generalized directly to decision-making, but the
subjects are fairly similar to competent managers in skills, training, and aspiration.
More interestingly, they view themselves as very much alike; from their responses to
a detailed questionnaire on their general approaches to work and study, it was im-
possible to pick out those of one cognitive style from the other. As the discussion
of the experiment will show, they are entirely different in their problem-solving
behavior in terms of the type of problems they enjoy, their performance, the flow and
structure of their arguments, and even their use of language. Hopefully, the dis-
cussion will establish the main points of this paper: that, regardless of the specific
labels we attach, the concept of cognitive style is a useful framework for examining
one's own and other people's approaches to problems, and that it provides some broad
insight into decision-making behavior.
The paper does not describe in detail either the main model of style or the exper-
iments which developed or applied it; these are outlined elsewhere and are tangential
to the more general aims of this paper. If the arguments in the following pages are
convincing, the paradigm of cognitive style they are based upon will obviously gain
credibility. The experiment here, however, largely points to important phenomena that
need explaining; the hope is to alert researchers, managers, and students to those phen-
omena and to convince them that cognitive style is an important component of the complex
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management behavior that they all, from differing viewpoints, try to understand and
assist
.
II . Styles of Problem-Solving
The model of cognitive style underlying this experiment is described in detail
elsewhere. (Keen 1973-'-) The full model is two-dimensional, classifying individuals in
terms of the strategies, implicit or explicit, that they use in:
1) information-gathering : screening and cataloguing new information from
their perceptual envircmment
2) information-evaluation ; assessing information and reaching a choice of
solution in problem-solving activity.
The second of these two dimensions is the one which is relevant to this study.
The paradigm of cognitive classifies problem-solving strategies along a spectrum rang-
ing from Systematic to Intuitive. The differences in the two extremes relate mainly
to planning. Some individuals are very methodological (which is in no Way the same as
methodical); their response to a problem is to explicitly define how they will ap-
proach it. Their main effort goes to laying out the constraints of the problem, sel-
ecting and then implementing a strategy. Their analysis is basically sequential, zero-
ing in on a solution through steps of increasing refinement; they try to set up their
definition of the problem so as not to have to repeat any step in the problem-solving
sequence. This Systematic mode of response is thus marked by several distinctive fea-
tures :
1) a conscious awareness of where any substep fits within the overall plan
2) an ordered sequence of search and analysis
3) the justification of a solution largely in terms of method. I
In many ways, the Systematic thinker's plan amounts to a program, in the computer
meaning of the word. Before the program is run, all the rules for action have been

-5-
specified so that the rest of the problem-solving process is mainly computational or
analytic; in a sense, the methodology guarantees the solution. This is not to say
that the program contains rigorously deterministic rules. Simon, Newell, and Shaw
showed in their early work on computer simulation of human thought, that many of them
are heuristic - rules of thimib that do not guarantee a correct ainswer , but which pro-
vide a high probability at relatively low cost of effort. Feigenbaum and Feldman
summarize heuristics as offering "solutions that are good enough most of the time"3.
Not surprisingly, the Systematic approach to problem-solving seems to be common
among engineers and production managers. They can - even should - make plans, since
they can anticipate the general features of their problems and thus refine their strat-
egy over time. The specific scheduling problems encountered by a plant manager may
range over a variety of levels of complexity, urgency, and tradeoffs, but he can gen-
erally articulate before he starts on a particular problem a methodology for handling
it. He can refine his plans as he learns; a common characteristic of engineers or
production personnel is their ability to use checklists or standard procedures in
crisis situations; their set of heuristics has been built up from many similar situa-
tions and generalized to the extent that it becomes a program that can be put into
immediate and effective action.
Part of the difficulty in discussing Intuitive style is that unlike Systematic
thinking it lacks conscious definition and visible structure. Its most obvious feature
is a reliance on unverbalized responses; if the subject is not aware of how to articu-
late these, the researcher will be even less likely to do so. However, Intuitive prob-
lem-solving does have an underlying set of characteristics that are as consistent and
purposeful as the Systematic' s conscious plans. The main principle governing the
Intuitive 's sequence of thought is a continuous global sense of the whole problem.
Once the Systematic thinker has defined the problem and his methodology for dealing
with it, he can largely leave the original problem-statement behind. He can also
break the process up into a series of discrete substeps - his plan provides the frame-
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work. for fitting them together into a coherent sequence. The Intuitive by contrast
continually relates a step in his analysis to the overall problem, ' implicitly asking
"does it fit together? does it make sense?" as he proceeds. This allows him to work
with much more ambiguity in the problem. For instance, a manager who is asked to
forecast consumer preferences over the next two years for men's shirt styles has a
problem that is hard to fit into any plan. The Intuitive 's response may well be init-
ially to scan over a wide range of ideas and information, developing a sense of the
issues and testing out some concepts well before he even defines the problem as such.
He might, for example, review his own buying habits and his wife's influence on them,
scan Sears Roebuck catalogues for the last two years and read through an industry
report on the subject of men's fashions. The search is not random, but it is hardly
planned. He may draw some tentative conclusions from each area of this initial ana-
lysis and the process of fitting them together or resolving some contradictions among
them may then lead him to define the real "problem" which he might feel is to identify
the lagged relationships between shifts in style in women's fashions and men's. He
may, at that point, be able to articulate a systematic plan, perhaps in the form of
instructions to a staff analyst. It is important to note that when he began his ana-
lysis he had no direct reference point for determining the relevance of each step.
The Systematic can assess the value (and purpose) of reading the Sears catalogues by
reviewing his methodology; the Intuitive 's rationale is much more one of "let's see
what I can get out of this". His reference point has to be his sensitization to the
overall implications of the problem and an alertness to the meaning of what he has
just done at each stage in the process. It is in this sense that he mainly relies on
"feel" and cues where the Systematic uses method and plan.*^
In this example of forecasting shirt fashions, the manager evaluates a wide range
of information, whose relevance cannot be anticipated. He thus cannot afford to re-
view it exhaustively and must be ready to discard lines of exploration that are un-
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promising very quickly. Largely for this reason, the Intuitive does not verbalize
his problem-solving to anywhere near the same extent that the Systematic thinker does.
Essentially, verbalization involves the use of very limited channel capacity. Broad-
bent cind others have shown that man seems to have a two-level memory structure.^
Short-term memory can hold a few items - the Magic Number Seven" of Miller's essay -
for a fraction of a second. Memorization involves refreshing short-term memory
several times, so that the stimulus does not fade out, while committing it to the ap-
parently infinite long-term memory store. This process can be seen in everyday at-
tempts to memorize a telephone number; to store the number 605-9361 a person will
generally mutter it aloud or in his mind until it is learnt. Information in short-
term memory is at the fringe of consciousness; it seems a plausible guess, though it
is little more than that, to view the Intuitive as operating at this fringe, able to
pause and bring information into more conscious awareness when he hits on some worth-
while line of exploration. It is in this way that his strategy with its potentially
high fraction of false starts, redundancy and dead-ends can be successful. The
Systematic 's conscious awareness of what he is trying to do and of the direction of his
analysis means that he will process only the data that is likely to be relevant - his
plan in itself screens out noise and wasted effort. The Intuitive must operate with
immensely more speed than the Systematic because he has no such mechanism for screening;
the speed can only come from avoiding the substantial time lapses implicit in verbali-
zation. A common phenomenon in his thinking is the "hunch", an unarticulated sense
that some information or line of thought contains a vital cue. Quite often, that hunch
comes a few seconds after the cue itself; he then tries to recapture it by backtracking
and reconstructing his line of thought.
Cognitive style and learning are different facets of the same phenomenon, the dev-
elopment of the ability to handle problems in the very widest sense of the term. The
Systematic 's learning is in the direction of what Guilford terms "convergence" and the
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Intuitive's towards "divergence".
"In convergent thinking the aim is to discover the one right answer to
the problem set. It is highly directed, essentially logical thinking
of the kind required in science and mathematics. It is also the kind
required for the solution of most intelligence tests. In "divergent"
thinking, on the other hand, the aim is to produce a large number of
possible answers, none of which is necessarily more correct that the
others though some may be original. Such thinking is marked by its
variety and fertility rather than by its logical precision" (Zangwill)°
This comment seems a useful one in relating cognitive style and management occupations.
The Systematic Thinker's drive and hence his learning is towards convergence. Very ob-
viously, he is suited to and attracted to occupations that enable him to grow in this
fashion. Most engineers are Systematic in style; to an extent, the engineer is the
prototype of Systematic thinking. His learning is essentially in method and in for-
malization of problems and he refines his techniques over a period of time. There are
many management postions, often filled by individuals with an engineering background,
that both need and encourage this process. Production, distribution and administra-
tive fucntions are clearly of this type. The Intuitive's learning is aimed towards
divergence; in a role such as plant manager, the demands of the task and his own growth
are in conflict - tt is not so much a question of whether or not he is competent in the
job, but that it does not "fit" his style, his process of problem-solving and assimi-
lating of experience. His divergent learning is much more one of self-confidence. He
needs to internalize his experience to a degree that he will feel confident in going
out on a limb, trusting the sense that he cannot articulate but which has shown it-
self to be effective in previous situations. Over a period of time he will not neces-
sarily become more "divergent" in terms of being able to invent more and more solutions
but he will develop a skill in generating a variety of useful solutions - if the con-
text of his job makes that desirable . As in most such processes involving the assimi-
lation of complex feedback, there is a chicken-and-egg aspect to this. The Intuitive
needs the context of such a job to allow him to produce the answers which over time
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increase his sense of confidence in his ability to thus operate intuitively. Again,
it is not necessarily a question of competence; in many management problems, the
Systematic and Intuitive will end up with the same solution, arrived at by a different
process. However, the fit between their style and the ongoing demands of the job may
well be different. Most ^-individuals have both Systematic and Intuitive capacity. It
is only when a person develops a marked imbalance in skills together with a preference
or instinct for a particular mode of problem-solving that he can be said to have a cog-
nitive "style". To an extent, cognitive differentiation is the likely outcome of a
specialized education and environment. This argument is supported by Altemeyer's re-
search at Carnegie-Mellon; he found that while freshmen in liberal arts and the scien-
ces couJd not be di f fernetiated as a group in terms of cognitive skills, there were
qdefinite and marked differences by the time they were seniors. This implies that
specialization in college studies leads to specialization in problem-solving behavior
as a whole. Perhaps there is a process here in which a person builds on his strengths
and thus further reinforces them, while at the same time his weaker skills atrophy.
This may well be the underlying explanation as to how a cognitive style emerges in a
particular individual; where his environment in his formative years leads him to dev-
elop a set of stable, effective and reliable responses he will tend to lean on them
,
and use them in most situations. Of course, this also implies that a cognitive style
need not develop; the more general the person's education and environment, the less he
is likely to show such a cognitive specialization. Piaget's concepts of assimilation-
accommodation are very compatible with this suggestion.
An analogy with cognitive style may be found in other dichotomies in psychology,
such as extrovert/introvert. Extremes of introversion and extraversion obviously occur
but most people fall into a middle, neutral range. It is not that they are of neither
psychological type, but that they show both characteristics at different times and in
different situations. It is useful to relate a person's "intorversion" to his behavior
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only when it is marked enough to be a consistent style of response. Similarly, the
term cognitive style is intended to describe the case where an individual's response
to information-processing and problem-solving is consistently in a particular mode.
That fraction of the population that has a definite style will partly depend on defi-
nition; exactly as with extraversion and introversion, the choice of cutpoint between
"neutral" and introvert is critical and inevitably to some degree arbitrary. A
rough estimate of the proportion of managers whose behavior is sufficiently differ-
entiated to merit the term "style" can thus be at best a guess. Over the duration
of the research here on cognitive style, the estimate that has emerged and that seems
an acceptable one is that 60-70% of the various subjects tested do have a distinct
style.
The term "switcher" seems applicable to people who do not manifest a definite
style. These are individuals who are not cognitive specialists in any sense; they can
adapt their response to particular problems; they do react more to the problem-stimulus
itself instead of imposing their own mode onto the problem. The switcher's ability
is more general; as with people of strong cognitive style, they have assets and weak-
nesses. They may well cover the middle-ground very effectively. They can deal with
most problems the encounter. Obviously, however, there are extreme types of problem
where they are less at ease or less capable than a strongly Systematic or strongly In-
tuitive person. It seems likely that even the switcher will veer towards one mode of
style if his work experience increasingly focuses on one functional area or type of
problem. Cognitive specialization thus seems both natural and desirable for special-
ized job functions. Cognitive style would seem slow to change since it is an integral
part of personality. None the less, the general urge towards cognitive ease, learning
and effective commerce with one's environment would require some adaptation. Once
again, the anthroplogical analogy is a v£ilid one; success leads to a reliance on and
confidence in particular responses and a corresponding atrophy of others and at a
certain point this process hardens into a stable structure.
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Figure 1 btlow summarizes the main characteristics of each mode of cognitive style:
Figure 1. Characteristics of Each Mode of Cognitive Style
Systematic thinkers tend to:
look for a method and make a plan for solving a problem
be very conscious of their approach
defend the quality of a solution largely in terms of the method
define the specific constraints of the problem early in the process
discard alternatives quickly
move through a process of increasing refinement of analysis
conduct an ordered search for additional information
complete any discrete step in analysis that they set out on
Intuitive thinkers tend to:
keep the over-all problem continuously in mind
redefine the problem frequently as they proceed
rely on unverbalized cues, even hunches
defend a solution in terms of "fit"
consider a number of alternatives and options simultaneously
jump from one step in analysis or search to another and back again
explore and abandon alternatives very quickly
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III. Identifying and Measuring Cognitive Style
Psychometries is a complex science in which subtleties of methodological and
statistical technique are of central importance. Developing a system for measuring
cognitive style has thus been both time-consuming and difficult. The scheme that
has emerged from that process is fairly broad, in that it discriminates well among
subjects of a strong cognitive style, but is hot as reliable in classifying those
who are less specialized in their problem-solving behavior. However, it seems fairly
robust: used as the basis for a set of experiments exploring the implications of
style, it pointed to relationships among subjects that were both consistent and conson-
ant with the definitions of the model. In the context of the experiment discussed
here, the exact details of the classification method are not really important: it
provided a basis for dividing subjects into two groups, Intuitive and Systematic, and
the aim of the experiment is to examine differences in problem-solving behavior be-
tween those groups - the differences themselves are the focal point of interest.
The basis for classifying subjects' cognitive style was to compare performance on
two standard pencil-and-paper tests requiring an Intuitive mode of problem-solving
with two others which demand a Systematic response. The absolute level of performance
is not relevant; the concept of cognitive style refers to relative performance. For
example, a subject scoring 15 out of 20 on the Systematic and 13 out of 20 on the
Intuitive pair of tests does not have as pronounced a style as one who scores 10 and
4 respectively, even though he obviously has more overall cognitive ability. The mech-
anics of classifying style are shown in the following examples:
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Figure 2. 12 3 4
Subject score on tests requiring Total of % of total Cognitive
Systematic Intuitive all tests accounted for Style
capacity capacity by Systematic
A 15 5 20 75 SYS
B 12 4 16 75 SYS
C 20 18 38 51
D 14 11 25 56
E 9 16 25 36 INT
F 2 8 10 20 INT
Subject A is classified as Systematic; of his total score of 20 points, 15 are account-
ed for by the two Systematic tests. Similarly, subject E is Intuitive with only 35%
of his total score being obtained on the Systematic tests. Subject D is not regarded
as Systematic even though he scores more highly on Systematic than on Intuitive capacity;
the difference is not marked enough to justify labelling him as Systematic, In choos-
ing a cutpoint between Systematic, Neutral, and Intuitive, a very conservative position
was taken and subjects classified as Systematic only when their performance was mark-
edly better on one mode of capacity than the other.
The four tests used in this scheme are all short (5 to 8 minutes) and part of
ETS's huge inventory^ sample questions from the tests are given in Appendix A.
The tests were administered to 5 samples of MBA students and to 100 middle-level
managers over a three year period. The results were similar for all the samples. Ap-
proximately 70% of the subjects showed a definite cognitive style (40% Systematics,
30% Intuitive). There are some very real methodological issues only partially resol-
ved in these experiments (particularly, the use of homogenous groups of MBA students,
the development of a method for equating scores on each of the four very dissimilar
tests, and the factoring out of motivational influences, visual vs. verbal skill, etc).
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None the less, as a broad indicator of cognitive style, the use of the four tests
seems very adequate. Moreover, subsequent experiments applying the classifications
generated consistent and plausible results. Of partictilar interest in those experi-
ments was a marked association between cognitive style and the Thinking-Feeling di-
chotomy (TF) measured in the Myers-Briggs Psychological Type Indicator. •'• There
was no association whatsoever between performance on the tests and the TF scale, that
is, there is no apparent relation between personality and cognitive ability. However,
an imbalance or bias in cognitive functioning seems to also include a similar bias in
personality.
The Myers-Briggs Indicator measures psychological type as defined by Jung.
Myers defines Thinking in terms of reaching Judgements through a logical process re-
lying on an "impersonal finding". Thinking stresses "realism" analysis, logic, crit-
ical faculty. Feeling, by contrast, takes its reference point for judgement from in-
ternal values and emotive responses; it makes little appeal to external validation.
It was predicted that the Thinking type would tend to be Systematic in style and that
the Feelintj type would be Intuitive. The Systematic thinker is very much concerned,
in his focus on methodology, with external validation; he looks for a process of prob-
lem-solving that can be replicated or programmed and whose steps can be independently
verified. The intuitive relies much more on his own "sense" of things, which is simi-
lar in nature to Jung's "Feeling". The Systematic subjects were almost all Thinking
in type (88%, n=25) while the Intuitives were predominantly Feeling (55%, n=29)
.
These results are striking given that in all Myers huge samples, 70% of business stu-
dents and engineers are Thinkers. The MBA samples contained 75% Thinkers, so that the
association between feeling and an Intuitive style seems stronger than the 55% figure
may suggest. Myers' summary of the characteristics of the two psychological types
meshes well with and fleshes out the description in figure 1 of the problem-solving
behavior associated with each cognitive style. She suggests that the strength of the
two types are
:
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Thinking Type Feeling Type
analysis
organization
weighing "the law and the evidence"
finding flaws in advance
holding consistently to a policy
reforming what needs reforming
standing from against opposition
persuasion
concentration
teaching
forecasting how others will feel
advertising
selling
appreciating other's thinking
It is worth stressing that Myers defines the TF dichotomy largely in terms of inter*
personal behavior. An interesting implication of cognitive style, discussed later
in this paper, is its impact on communication and mutual understanding. Myers also
provides a detailed summary, backed by substantial testing in a variety of settings,
of the academic and occupational interests of each type. These are shown in figure 4
below. The Myers-Briggs Indicator measures four scales of Type: the TF scale domi-
nated the results of this experiment; however, a second scale, S6nsing-Intuition
(where the definition of Intuition is distinctly different from Intuitive in the model
of cognitive style) showed some relation to style. In figure A, the four categories
roughly correspond to degree of style; ST subjects are very likely indeed to be Sys-
tematic, NT also likely but not quite to the same extent, and at the other extreme NF
subjects are almost certain to be Intuitive in style.
Figure 4
Cognitive Style
people who prefer:
Systematic
Sensing + Intuition +
Thinking Thinking
(ST) (NT)
Intuitive
Sensing + Intuition
Feeling Feeling
(SF) (NF)
focus their at-:
tent ion on
Facts Possibilities Facts Possibilities
and handle these;
with
Impersonal
analysis
Personal
warmth
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Figure 4 (continued )
Cognitive Style Systematic Intuitive
thus they tend:
to be
Practical Intellectually
matter-of-fact ingenious
Sociable Enthusiastic
friendly insightful
and find their: Production Research
scope in Accounting Science
Business Invention
Economics Securities
Law analysis
Management
Sales Research
Service Teaching
Customer Preaching
relations Writing
Welfare Counselling
work Psychology
In an additional experiment, using 82 MBA subjects, some similar relations were
found between cognitive style and occupational preference as measured by the popular
(and reliable) Strong Vocational Interest Blank (SVIB)-*-^. Systematic subjects tended
to score highly on occupations which had administrative or business connotations,
(and the Intuitives displayed more compatibility with open-ended professional or art-
istic positions. The SVIB measures the extent to which the subject's interests are
similar to those of individuals who have been in a particular occupation for at least
three years and who report that they are satisfied with their job. Thus, though
Intuitives score significantly more highly on the occupational scales for Artist,Music
performer, and Librarian, this cannot be interpreted as an aptitude for or active in-
terest in those fields. The differences between the Systematic and Intuitive subjects
are statistically significant and conceptually meaningful, but obviously, one must
assess them cautiously. The widest differences between the two modes of cognitive
style were as shown below:
Figure 5
Systematics score higher on:
Purchasing agent
Production
Army officer
Intuitives score higher on:
Psychologist
Librarian
CPA owner
Advertising
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Figure 5 (continued)
Systematics scored higher on: Intuitives scored higher on:
Personnel Director Lawyer
Public Administrator Author/Journalist
Sales manager Music performer
Chamber of Commerce Executive Social Science Teacher
The Systematic group's preferences are marked by their being largely admini-
strative, business positions involving planning, control and supervision. The In-
tuitive 's are more heterogenous and less structured. They involve much less feed-
back; all the occupations listed above for the Intuitive group lack the characteristic
of clear criteria for action with clear feedback of results found in the Systematic
group's preferred occupations. These overall characteristics provide at least circimi-
stantial evidence in support of the theoretical formulation of the model. All the
experiments cursorily summarized above suggest that the overall paradigm of cognitive
style has conceptual validity, some operational soundness, and point to some interest-
ing phenomena. As a package, they amount to an existence proof; the model makes
sense and hangs together. However, the experiments provide limited insight into the
complex processes of problem-solving. Hopefully, even in this brief summary, the
claim that the model of cognitive style provides a meaningful organizing focus for ex-
amining differences in thinking has been established. The question that should always
be asked of any theoretical paradigm of this type - "So what?" - is to be answered in
the rest of this paper.
IV. The Cafeteria Experiment
A distinct limitation of the set of tests used in the scheme for classifying
cognitive style is that it focuses on problem-solving capacity ; an individual's style
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is measured in terms of his differences in scores between tests requiring a System-
atic and those requiring an Intuitive approach. The implicit argument is that an in-
dividual who scores highly on, say, the Intuitive tests and mediocrely on the System-
atic ones is unable to adjust his responses, lacks ability to behave systematically;
in this sense, his innate mode of response - his style - is Intuitive.
The "Cafeteria " experiment focuses on response rather than capacity. It ex-
plores how individuals "get into" problems and the direction and common themes of their
problem-solving process. Twenty-five students were selected from the main sample of
107 who completed the original test battery. There were two criteria used in select-
ing these students:
1) they all were individuals whose style was clearly identifiable
2) they scored highly on at least one of the four pairs of tests used to
classify style (eight tests measuring the four modes of style in the full
paradigm)
The group was thus both distinctive in style and very capable - their style is based
more on a real ability in a particular mode of problem-solving than on a disability
along the other mode of style. Of the 25 students initially picked out, 20 agreed to
take part in the experiment, which involved a one and a half hour session, held on an
individual basis; the sessions were tape-recorded. The experiment centered around
the problem "cafeteria", a set ofproblems designed or borrowed from other sources by
this researcher. The subjects were presented with the menu of 16 questions from which
they were asked to pick out any 5 to answer, using whatever criteria for choice they
wished (hence the term "cafeteria") They were invited to talk aloud during the eight
minutes assigned to each problem. Otherwise they answered the questions in writing.
Most subjects answered at least one question orally, though there were several who
preferred to work entirely in silence.
Theproblems in the cafeteria were intended to provide subjects with ample scope
for mapping themselves onto the problem. The tests in the main cognitive battery
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are all brief, with a right answer and no real opportunity for wide-ranging strate-
gies. The problems in the cafeteria by contrast tend to be open-ended with, in many
cases, no definite answer. Several were almost a problem-solving Rorschafch; for ex-
ample, one problem presented a result of a poll, showing the responses of three groups,
teachers, parents and administrators. Subjects were asked which side of the unspeci-
fied issue they would support, on the basis of "public opinion" and what they felt
the issue actually was. It was hoped that problems of this sort would highlight sub-
jects' habits and strategies. Of the twenty students, one is excluded from this ana-
lysis simply.because his style, though distinctive in terms of the Information-gather-
ing dimension, was not marked enough on the Systematic-Intuitive scale to allow him
to be confidently classified. The remaining 19 subjects divide fairly evenly:
11 Intuitives
8 Systematics
Figure 6 summarizes their performances on the original cognitive tests. The scores
shown are the result of converting each subject's performance to a one-to-seven scale,
where "1" indicates the subject was in the lowest l/7th of the 107 subjects and a "7"
shows he scored in the top 7^^, Thus, the maximum score on each pair of tests is 14
and the minimum is 2. The reasons for using this very conservative scoring are given
in Keen 1973; essentially it ensures that large differences in performance are re-
quired before a subject can be classified as having a particular style. This runs
the risk of failing to identify subjects who do have a definite cognitive style, but
minimizes the likelihood of pointing to relationships that are coincidental. The
method seems very desirable in testing a new paradigm; the burden of proof is on the
researcher and evidence should be weighted against, not in favor of, the model.
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Flgure 6
Total Scores on Each Pair of Tests
Subject SYS INT % of Total Accounted
for by Systematic tests
Intuitives A 6
B 5
C 5
D 3
E 3
F 5
G 6
H 4
I 9
J 3
K 4
14

-21-
The small size of the sample is due solely to limitations of resources. Even this
limited group required 30 hours of a research assistant's time, excluding experi-
mental overhead. In retrospect, the insights provided from the experiment would
seem to have justified a much larger sample. Moreover, the small size of the grou^,
and particularly of the subgroups (Systematic vs. Intuitive etc.) makes formal test-
ing of hypotheses difficult; there is simply no enough volume of evidence (cell counts
etc.) for the mathematics of tests such as chi-square to work. Though the focus of
the experiments is intendedly qualitative rather than quantitative, there is always
the need to demonstrate that "interesting" results also pass the often limited but
rigorous tests of statistical inference. It must also be stressed that this sample
is a highly select one, drawn on a very specialized basis from an already specialized
larger sample of MBA students. If the aim in this experiment was to identify cogni-
tive styles, the sampling procedure would make standard statistical analysis illegi-
timate. However, that initial step was accomplished in the earlier analyses and the
Cafeteria experiment deliberately look at subjects whose ability and behavior repre-
sent extremes of style.
The problem cafeteria is shown in Appendix B. It consists of 16 problems which
range widely in type and complexity.
One of the aims of the experiment was to compare the choice of problems in each
group. There were indeed some marked differences. The Intuitives showed a def-
inite preference over the Systematics for problems requiring a focus on conceptuali-
zation and rapid explicit hypothesis-testing. The problems they chose more fre-
quently and rated more enjoyable, were all largely deductive in type, requiring a
rapid ranging over alternatives and ideas and not permitting any easy decomposition
into steps and substeps. The problems favored by the Systematics, by contrast, tend-
ed to need a convergent approach. 16
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Figure 8 shows the problems selected by each subject; the two problems rated
as most enjoyable are underlined.
Figure 8
Subject
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
Problems Selected by Each Subject
Problem Number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
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llie small pxpcctccJ and observed frequencies for each problem make it difficult
to compare the choices of the Systematic and Inlultlvi' urinii'H a( .it t.-u I .a 1 1 v . I'licno
is a clearcut difference on problems 9 and 15 in Figure 8 that is worth pointing to
independently. All the Intultives who chose No. 15 rate it as most or second most
enjoyable; none of the Systematics do so. The situation is the reverse for No. 9:
(No. 15 involves decoding a ciphered message and No. 9 classifying words into lists)
No. choosing problem
No. rating most enjoyable
Total No. of subjects in
this group
Problem 15
Sys Int
3 6
6
8 11
Problem 9
Sys Int
5 6
5 2
8 11
Both these problems were ones where substantial insight could be obtained about the
subjects' problem-solving processes; problem 15 was answered orally by 6 out of the
9 subjects who chose it and with problem 9 it was easy to identify the overall strat-
egy used by each subject regardless of whether or not he responded orally or confin-
ed himself to a written answer.
The tape recorded sessions include 38 instances where the subject provides a
totally oral reply to the problem. This amounts to over a third of the 100 answers
(20 subjects x 5 problems). It was strongly hoped that there would be a reasonably
high prportion of oral response; they are clearly likely to reveal more of the sub-
jects problem-solving process than a written answer, which tends to focus on the
final solution and the immediate steps leading to it. No effort was made to require
oral replies. The "thinking aloud" approach is very popular in studies of problem-
17 '
solving; Simon and Newell rely on it almost entirely. Gagne and Smith, among others,
suggest, however, that a subject's problem- solving process is very different when
he is forced to talk aloud as he goes than when he is not.-'-° For this experiment.
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it thus seemed essential to allow the subject to respond as he wished and not to
force him Into a procedure that was not natural for him. Not surprisingly, some
problems were answered by most subjects orally and some mostly in writing; Problem
1 for example, which is mathematical, produced few oral replies while "opinion"
problems such as 7 and 11 generated more oral that written answers. Similarly some
subjects are distinctly the silent type and a few very verbal indeed.
There are some distinct and interesting problems in using verbal data. It is
harder to compare between subjects, is less manipulable than numeric data and most
importantly, there is just too much of it. A half-hour tape contains a bewildering-
ly large volume of data; the difficulty is to condense, interpret, and shape it. It
is also easy, consciously or otherwise, to cheat; from the mass of data available,
one may too often pick out highlights that are subtly unrepresentative. In dealing
with taped protocols, one needs some ground rules. The ones chosen for this experi-
ment, which reflect the underlying hypotheses are:
1) to focus on the first paragraphs of a subject's response as most indica-
tive of his strategy and immediate response to the problem.
2) to avoid comparing apples and oranges; this means not comparing subject
A's first sentence with B's final paragraph, but either quoting the whole
of the two protocols or quoting both apples and then both oranges.
The predictions to be tested as to the differences in protocol between the
Systematic and Intuitive group came directly from the characteristics of each mode
of problem-solving given earlier in Figure 1. There is also a secondary hypothesis
to be tested; it was expected that the Intuitive group would tend to respond to the
problems orally rather than silently, and vice versa for the Systematic group. In-
tuitive individuals seem to use thinking aloud as a way of cueing themselves; their
own verbal responses often serve to alert them to possible avenues of analysis and
exploration. This whole aspect of the problem-solving behavior of the 20 subjects
will be explored fully later in the argument.
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Problem 15 has more oral replies, six in all, than any other problem; it
provides a useful starting point for this reason. In addition, it is of interest
because of the striking preference the Intuitives show for it. All 6 who selected
it, rated it as most or second most enjoyable. The problem involves deciphering a
message in a simple code. The message is shown below together with the solution:
VEY CO XTS XCMS BEF IDD KEEJ MSV XE AEMS XE XTS ICJ EB XTS NIFXQ
NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL GOOD MEN TO COME TO THE AID OF THE PARTY
The actual cipher is indeed simple: the letter C is coded as an A, and the sequence
thereafter is to skip two letters (D and E) and set the next one equal to B, skip
two (G and H) and set the next equal to C etc. The message was chosen fairly careful-
ly. It contains several possible cues. For example, the sequence "XE AEMS XE" is
useful to the alert subject; there are very few such combinations of a two-letter
word separated by another - the most obvious cases are "as.... as", "to to" and
"of.. ..of". In addition, the frequencies of letters are different enough from the
general average to make deciphering the message a little difficult. The most com-
mon letter in the decoded message is "0" not as subjects naturally expect "E". "E"
is only the third most frequent letter in the sentence. The message chosen was a
well-known phrase rather than some sentence such as "Today the weather bureau is
closed due to a holiday" to give an edge to the subject who focuses on pattern.
In this problem - as in almost all of them - it was expected that Systematic
subjects will focus on how to solve the problem, would choose a definite method, and
follow it through. By contrast, the Intuitive will look for clues, try out a hypo-
thesis and build up the message by fitting the jigsaw together.
Of the nine subjects choosing the problem, three - all Intuitives - successful-
ly decoded the message: the table below shows, very approximately, how much pro-
gress each subject made:
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Systematics:
Subject L - no progress; unlikely to have solved tho problptn within n h;»lf-hour
M - about halfway through solving it; several errors, but seems likely
to reach the solution given extra time
T - admitted to being stumped; no progress towards a solution
Intuitives:
Subject B - little progress; quickly gave up (***)
D - solved the problem in under a minute
E - close to solution, ran out of time
H - total failure, on the wrong track entirely (***)
I - solved the problem in four minutes
J - reached the solution almost exactly on the time limit
Summary Sys Int
no progress 2 2
some progress 1 1
correct solution 3
(The "***" next to B and H is as a reminder that these two subjects still rated prob-
lem 15 as one of the two most enjoyable.)
The Systematic and Intuitive groups differ on the way in which they start off the
problem:
Subject L (Sys)
:
'%/hat I'm going to do is list how frequently various letters occur. It might
be a bit long. I'll try and spot the frequently occurring letters."
Subject M (Sys)
"I'm going to count the number of times each letter in the alphabet and dis-
cover which onergenerally speaking, are probably valid because they'll be
the ones that are used the most."
(The quotations are verbatim, with syntactic flaws left imdisturbed.)
Subject D (Int)
"If it's a simple substitution, one for one, we should be able to break it,
but if it's not, it's going to be very difficult. Do you know an old fel-
low by the name of ETAOIN SHRDLU? Those are the letters in the English
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Subject D (Int) continued:
"language by frequence of usage. So I "m lust no lug to make a map au.l
see what we come up with. "Now is the time for all good men to come
to the" - that should be "aid", yup, "of the party".
(This is the complete transcript for this subject; it is followed by the research
assistant's quiet query: "would you mind telling me how you did that?"
Subject H (Int):
"I'm just skimming through it to see what patterns there were. Obviously
the X is rather peculiar. I'm starting off first by looking at simple
transpositions like going one letter back or one letter forward or writ-
ing it backward."
Subject I (Int)
:
"One of the things you're supposed to do is look to see which letters are
used because the six most common twelve - are ETAOIN SHRDLU, so for a long
code I guess you can do it that way. If there are a lot of S's and there
are, OK, clearly in eight minutes you've got to make a lot of guesses."
Subject J (Int)
"I'm going to write down all the letters of the alphabet. If it makes
sense, maybe I'm going to shift all the letters back and see what happens.
Move every letter one forward."
Subject M (quoted earlier) is the most Systematic of all the 20 subjects; his score
on the two Systematic test was 12 and only 2 on the Intuitive ones, the lowest pos-
sible score. His approach to problem 15 is consciously programmatic, and though he
does not get the answer, it appears probable that he would in the end, given enough
time. His protocol is fairly lengthy. It is noteworthy that he, like Subject L who
is also Systematic, comments on the fact that there is an alternative approach which
he labels the "shot-gun" method:
"I'm going to coimt the number of each letter in the alphabet and discover
which ones generally speaking are probably valid, because they'll be the
ones which are used the most. "E" is either an "0" or an "E", probably
an "0". Now there's another way, there are two ways to approach this prob-
lem . One is the long way, which I am doing, which I will not get done in
8 minutes. However, in the long run, if I had more than 8 minutes I be-
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"lieve would pay off. The other way is more of a shotgun approach and
that's to look at the words and say this could be what, fill it in and
try moving all over the paper filling in. For instance, I could say
'VEY' is 'the' - 'the' is probably the most common word in the language,
making 'V' a 'T' and so on and start substituting arid figure out that
way. I don't like the shotgun at all. I think it's less efficient in
this case. Sometimes in a situation you really have no other choice.
And since I'm not really concerned about finishing - though I wouldn't
mind staying afterwards to finish it because my curiosity - I'd like
to know what the heck it is.
Now let's see, we have 'E's, 'S's and 'X's, so they are probably A,E
I or — U is usually down the list. If we take a look we'll look
for a 'THE' usually ....OK, let's take a shot at this one; we'll make
all 'C's I's, 'O's will be N's, 'X's will be T's. I don't like that
though. In other words, I'm looking at the second two words as being
'in the', but that doesn't work out too well. But that might: 'E's
are probably O's. I think all 'E's are O's. I've just got a gut feel
here. I'll make the 'S's E's. OK, 'XTS' three times — I'll assume
they're all 'the's; going on that all the 'S's are E's, got those in,
all the 'T's become H's. Any other 'T's? All the 'X's become T's
and that's pretty good.
'XE' becomes 'to'. OK, Something 'in the time'. OK, now we have to
come up with the other words. 'AEMS' looks like 'come'. One 'A',
three 'M's. 'M's could be M, yes, M or N's. OK, so that makes, means
A's or c's, there's only one, so we've got '— in the time— — — —
to come to the — — the — ' OK, 'EB' could be 'on', could be 'or'.
'B' is R. Two 'B's. That doesn't help too much. 'In the time
biank or the blank' . Would have taken a little .time more maybe I
would have got it. The key to this would have been the 'KEEJ', double
Something. 'Blank MEx to come to the' could it be? Can't think of
it offhand. Once that would have fallen, I think. I would have had,
let's see, the 'J' would have fallen. 'BEF' , would 'F' have helped?
Not particularly. 'In the time RO..' I'd just go through the
alphabet.
"
Subject M made an early mistake in assigning 'in' to'CO'. However, he is zero-
ing in on the answer in a fairly orderly sequence. The protocol for L, the other Sys-
tematic who answered orally, is similar to M's. He too comments on the time-consuming
nature of his chosen method. Close to the time limit, he in fact admits that his
'methodical' approach will not work in the eight minutes: "I'm now trying to do it
more intuitively than methodically. If 1 had more time I'd probably take the metho-
dical approach to it." The protocol for subject M does match that expected for the
Systematic. There is the formal statement at the start of how he plans to tackle the
problem. He picks out a first substep, looking for a word with the three most common
letters in it and then fills in all the T's, H's and E's. He then picks a second sub-
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step, still within the initial plan, and uses the information available from set-
ting 'AEMS' equal to 'come'. His third substep works through the possibilities of
'EB'. He recognizes, having been told that his time is up, that 'KEEJ' may be the
key to getting the answer; he implies that he was leaving this to come up in its
turn, in an orderly fashion within his program.
Perhaps it is a little close to special pleading to next pick out subject H's
protocol to compare with M's. H failed badly in this problem, but he still felt
that it was the most enjoyable of all. He is a very capable Individual, scoring the
maximum of 14 on the Intuitive scale. He protocol highlights the risk inherent in
the Intuitive approach. He looks for cues and the ones he picks up are potentially
veiy useful, but he gets into a wrong line of thinking and is quickly cut adrift:
"I'm just skimming through to see what patterns there were. Obviously
the 'X' is rather peculiar. I'm starting off first by looking at simple
transpositions like going one letter back or one letter forward or writ-
ing it backwards....! can't find anything there. I'm looking at it another
way. The 'X's and number of 'E's and so on.... There are some obvious
things that spring out like 'IDD' is obviously 'DID' — or might be —
or 'AEMS' might be 'same'. But I'm not really — that's a possible pattern.
Some words you can sort of turn around to make sense, but other words you
can't. It doesn't seem likely that 'X' is standing for another letter,
because in some words it just wouldn't fit in at all if it was — 'XCMS'
.
Could fit in smmething there. Well, what's the answer?"
Clearly subject H has no plan and no method; one might ascribe his failure to that
fact. However, two other Intuitive subjects show the same overall characteristics as
H in their protocols and solve the problem.
Subject J:
"I'm going to write down all the letters of the alphabet. If it makes sense,
maybe I'm going to shift all the letters back and see what happens. Move
every letter one forward. W, F, Z..,.T, C. I'm just trying to take every
letter back, like starting with 'V' and moving back two, three, fqur. Then
find a simple code... I think the letters are scrambled. I'll see what happens
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"All right. If the whole alphabet were tansposed, a 'V would be
A.
equivalent to V plus A which would be Z.... That doesn t do it.
Try backwards, ^on't think this right. I'll try a longer one.
See which letters are used most. 8E's, 7X's. If 'X' is a T...
and 'E' is an 0, 'TO', 'B' is an F. Not getting anywhere vevy
fast. Say 'T' is an H and 'S' is an E. If 'X' is a T,',2,3,
backwards. I don't see why they say this is a simple code....
Sure, once you know the answer it's very simple. .. 'Now is the
time for all good men to come to the aid of the party."
Subject J's initial hypothesis is no better than H's. His reasoning is hard to follow
in fact. He tries out se\;eral ideas at the same time. For example, while testing
his notion of shifting the letters backwards or forwards he is also guessing that the
letters are scrambled. Similarly, having correctly identified 'XTS' as 'the' by
counting the main frequencies of letters he immediately switches back to checking on
the shift; presumably his '1,2,3' refers to the shift of three letters E to H between
'S' in the cipher which equals E and 'T' which equals H. This at once gives him the
full code. H does not have any formal plan. He is obviously alert to the implications
of what he finds as he goes along. In his protocol — and even more dramatically in
D's, the full transcript of which was given earlier, there is the sudden almost unex-
plained jump to the solution. There seems to be a necessary incubation, the assimi-
lation of a mass of unconnected concepts that fairly suddenly merge into a whole. It
is this aspect of intuition that gives it the overtone of magic - of inexplicable 'hunch'
Figure 1 listed the characteristics of the two styles of problem-solving that
constituted the hypotheses as to how the subjects would approach the problems here.
The three protocols given here seem to show most of the features indicated: for the
sake of completeness it would be useful to quote the other protocols for subjects who
answered problem 15 orally, but they do not provide any new insights and are in total
fairly lengthy. The table below siommarizes all the protocols in relation to Figure 1.
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Subject
Systematic characteristics:
1) look for a method, make
a plan
2) conscious of approach
3) defend solution in terms
of method
4) define constraints early
5) move through increasing
refinement
6) complete each substep
Systematic
L M
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Intuitive
D H I J
Y- N N N
Y- N N N
N
N N
N N N N
- N N N
N- N
Intuitive characteristics:
1) keep the overall problem
in mind - -
2) redefine problem fre-
quently N N
3) rely on unverbalized cues N N Y N
4) defend solution in terms of fit N- N- - -
5) several alternatives simul-
taneously N N - -
6) jump from one step to another N N Y Y
7) abandon alternatives quickly N N - Y
(Y= yes, N= no, -= no basis on which to decide)
The reader must judge from the protocols for subjects M, H and J whether or not the
assessments above are reasonable; they attempt to err on the side of caution. They do
support the predictions. The two Systematic subjects on the whole show 'Y' in the
top half of the table, listing Systematic characteristics, and 'N' in the bottom half.
The summary table below in no way suggests that the Yeses and Noes have equal weights,
but is useful in examining the total picture implied by them:
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Subject L M D H I J Sys Int
Systematic features:
Yes
No
Undetermined
4
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Intuitive features: L M D H I J Sys Int
Yes 001264 13
No 550210 10 3
Undetermined 2263034 12
It is somewhat ironic that subject D's protocol does not provide enough information
to classify its features; his response was so quick and contained so little insight
into his method that classification is impossible in these terms, but the word Intui-
tive certainly seems necessary to describe the outcome of his one minute's thinking.
It does appear reasonable to conclude from the summary above that had the classi-
fications of Figure 1 been used to score each subject's protocol they would have cor-
rectly assigned all the subjects except D to their cognitive style category; D would
have been left unassigned. This one problem at least provides some very strong evi-
dence in favor of both the specific assertions of this experiment and the more general
overall arguments.
Problem 9 provides a useful comparison with 15 in that it is as distinctly pre-
ferred by the Systematics as the latter is by the Intuitives. Unfortunately, none
of the five Systematics who chose the problem answered it orally, a fact that is
interesting in itself. Four of the six Intuitives did reply orally. No subject com-
pleted the problem^ which is not difficult but requires a careful, lengthy sorting
of 50 words into 10 groups. There seem to be two obvious strategies for easing the
cognitive strain on memory that is the main feature of the problem; the first is to
find a category then go through locating and sorting all the words within the category
and the second is essentially the reverse of this, grouping words together going as
completely through the list as possible. The first strategy is the more programmable
and thus seems suited to the Systematic approach. Since none of the 12 subjects
choosing the problem completed it, it is easy to identify their strategies from either
the tape or from their rough working on the question sheet (all the subjects wrote over
the list of words the category and/or position within the category, e.g., next to the
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word 'football' a subject would write '2c' meaning category 2 position c) . Strat-
egy 1 should result in fewer words being classified out of the total list of 50 than
would strategy 2, since it involves putting the main effort into completely classify-
ing all the words within a category. By contrast, strategy 2 involves going through
the whole list with little pause to sort the words fully within the category. The
table below shows the strategies used by each of the 6 Intuitive and 5 Systematic
subjects (it ignores the lone Receptor who chose the problem):
Subject
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the seven who used strategy 1. These results are not striking, though they support
the hypotheses.
Since there are no oral transcripts from the Systematics, there is little value
in analyzing the Intuitive's oral replies in detail. However, they contain an intrigu-
ing, if possibly coincidental feature; all four subjects began by saying that they did
not understand what was involved in the problem and asked for more explicit instruc-
tions. It is cleat that they also felt they should not have chosen the problem after
all:
Subject G:
"I've got to do all these? What am I supposed to do? I don't really
follow this. (Asks for instructions). Did I put down that this was
easy? It looks horrid now."
Subject I:
"Looking at it very quickly, it does not look as easy as one thought
it would."
Subject J:
"I'm not sure why I circled this. I don't even understand what I'm
supposed to do." i
J.A.Botkin used the cognitive style paradigm in an experiment on the use of computer
systems as learning aids. One of his main conclusions was that Intuitves do not read
instructions. Several of his subjects were quite explicit about that, commenting that
19
they never bothered to do so. It does not seem farfetched to relate this to the
Intuitive's preference for jumping into the problem and using self-correcting feedback
to clarify what is involved.
Both questions 15 and 9 have a definite answer. There are a number of problems
in the cafeteria where the solution is one of subjective opinion. This makes it dif-
ficult to evaluate the correctness or completeness of the answers given by subjects,'
but it also allows them great freedom of approach. A useful aspect of these problems
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from an experimental viewpoint is that they are answered orally more than are any of
the other ones. Problems 2, 3, 7 and 11 are the four that fall most obviously into
this group; they are answered by a substantial fraction of both the Systematic and
Intuitive subjects:
Intuitive Systematic
Problem No. Oral Written Oral Written
2 (poll) 3 3 2 1
3 (refute arguments) 3 1 1
7 (Germany and rise of
Nazis) 2 3 11
11 (game theory) 4 2. 14
12 9 4 7
There is a clear imbalance between the two groups in terms of the total number of
oral replies. However, there is sufficient data available here to compare them mean-
ingfully. (The subject of the problem is given in parentheses, albeit in cryptically
abbreviated form.)
The four problems are fairly varied; this is an advantage in testing the replies
against the chatacteristics of the two cognitive styles shown earlier in Figure 1.
The opening statement of the subject seems to give a clear immediate impression of his
response and strategy. The Systematic students frequently begin by stating the prob-
lem as they see it; this is in line with the predictions in Figure 1 and especially
interesting here in that the problems tend to be openended, sometimes ambiguous, so
that there is a definite need, at some stage, to close the open constraints. The
Systematics do this consciously at the start of their reply:
Subject M (Question 11):
"The problem for the twenty men seems to be that they should
get together and act as a group because the group pressure
of twenty people pitted against the group pressure of one person
is eventually going to intimidate that one person."
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Subject T (Question 2):
"The question seems to be looking at how far you're willing to go
with your assumptions. I refuse to make any decisions that are
not clear from the data."
The difference in flavor between these responses and the Intuitive group's are
clearcut
:
Subject F (Question 2):
"I kind of like this one. It's a policy question; that's why I
picked it. It looked easy to me. It doesn't involve a lot of
grunt work like I was doing in the first one (Question 1)."
Subject G (Question 3):
"We're supposed to be refuting the waiter here, because he says
'what difference does it make?' Theoretically, my arguments
here I don't have to believe in and neither would the guy
who's talking have to believe in them. He's just making argu-
ments. "
Subject J (Question 11):
"When I read this the first time it reminded me of the Olympics, you
know — the Arabs and Israelis. He obviously can't kill them all.
He's only got six bullets and once he runs our of bullets he's dead."
Subject H (Question 11)
:
"This situation is similar to a terrorist action type of case such
as a plane hijacking or the incident at the Olympic games in 1972." 5
On the whole, the oral transcripts largely confirm the findings of the more de-
tailed analysis of Problem 15, given earlier. There is, however, an additional feature
in the replies to these 'opinion' questions; the Systematic subjects all tend to choose
logic over subjective feelings. For example, question 2 requires coming down on one
side of an unknown issue on the basis of the outcome of a poll. The Systematics de-
cide on the basis of the logical or mathematical implications of the poll data:
Subject M:
"To come up with some explanation that will make both groups happy you're
going to have to weight their inputs which is the second solution (of four

-37-
subject M puts forward as possible approaches to the problem)
.
This seems to be the only way that will be fairest to all. As a
result, as there were 30 teachers, 30 administrators, 45 parents,
reduce the 45 parants to 30 by dividing by two-thirds."
By contrast, the Intuitives are much more immediately concerned with their own 'gut'
feelings:
Subject F (Question 2):
"I have a feeling that the way the problem's set up you should probably
make the decision to be anti — Just because the superintendent has
said he will support the public opinion I guess is the parents. That's
the way I see it. But I would decide pro — and I guess the reason I
would do that is because — I think I've decided what the issue is. I
think it's voting for tax increases or you know public prayer, a sex
education or something like that, that has been a policy issue. I
guess I'm influenced by what actually has happened. I guess my prejud-
ice is that I've disagreed with parents on those issues. I would al-
ways have sex education, I would always ban prayers in the schools. So
I would guess that's why I decided It that way."
Similarly, on Question 3, which asks for refutation of an argument:
Subject R (Sys) :
"Well, 1 would say that it's conclusively refuted. I don't think
there's any logical inconsistency. That, er, the man's goal was
presumably to have one or the other. Presumably, he's enquiring
rhetorically why it doesn't taste like what he ordered. The
waiter's argument presumes that it doesn't matter if he can't
taste the difference; it ignores that he wanted a specific taste."
Subject C (Int)
:
"The question was 'what difference does it make?', so I asked myself
does it matter to this individual who has to live, to the customer,
does it matter whether it's beef broth or not. From the waiter's
point of view, it doesn't matter to him because he made a sale on this
and from the customer's view they were buying something and wanted
something for their money and they might have an allergy, or dietary
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"reason or just because of their personal taste in food that it mat-
tered to them. So I saw it as a difference in point of view."
It is worth pointing out that the differences in response here are very similar to
those between the Thinking and the Feelings types on the Myers-Briggs type indicator. ^^
The illustration of these and other differences could be extended here by more
quotations; these would largely only reinforce the ones given earlier. There is a re-
markable unity within the two groups; regardless of the specific problem, the Intuitives
respond consistently in their distinctive style and so too do the Systematics. This
is, perhaps, the key outcome of the experiments. Of some 50 responses analyzed in de-
tail, there are only three instances where a subject seems to switch style - to reply
on one specific problem in a way that is different from the rest of his answers and
that appears to reflect an adjustment to the problem-stimulus itself. It needs to be
stressed that this small sample of students contains only extreme cases; each of them
was identified as having a strong cognitive style and therefore it is not too surpris-
ing that their style does dominate their problem-solving behavior. There is no sup-
position here that all individuals will show the same characteristics as these ones.
However, the experiment clearly suggests that cognitive specialization of the sort
found in these subjects has a powerful influence on their overall processes o^ problem-
solving.
A final feature of the two groups of subjects, already touched on, is the strong
tendency of the Intuitive students to respond orally. There is a chicken-and-egg
problem involved in determining whether this is because they also choose opinion
problems which are best answered aloud. Regardless, there is a clear difference between
the two groups. Over half the Intuitives' replies were oral, compared with 20% of the
Systematics:
Oral Written
Intuitive 28 27
Systematic 8 32
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(An oral reply is defined as one where the subject works aloud as he goes; most sub-
jects provide some explanation after they have finished of their approach to the
problem - this is of use in discussing their behavior, but is not counted as an oral
reply.) Botkin, in his experiments, found that the Intuitive subjects seemed to like
to talk aloud as they went along. They would ask questions, either of themselves or
of the experimenter, and frequently then jump off at a tangent without waiting for a
reply. This researcher found, as did Botkin, that the Intuitives were also likely to
leave sentences uncompleted. Both sets of transcriptions for Intuitive subjects in
22
the two experiments are full of ' ' indicating a broken off sentence. While
there is no real way here to formally test the hypothesis, it appears that the Intui-
tive style makes much use of 'thinking aloud' to guide, cue and stimulate progress.
This need to think aloud has an intriguing implication; the essentially rambling ver-
blaization is very useful, even vital, to the Intuitive himself. It is disturbing
waffle to a Systematic colleague.
The academic and work backgrounds, together with the Myers-Briggs type classifi-
cations (Thinking vs. Feeling) for each of the subjects are shown in Figure 9 below.
All three co limns in the table are suggestive. It is especially apparent that the
Systematic subjects both majored in engineering or related applied sciences and stayed
with engineering in their later work experience. By contrast, the engineering majors
in the Intuitive group tended to shift to other types of work. With such a small
sample, and with the preponderance of the students in the full sample being engineer-
ing and economic majors, it is hard to sort out the implications of this. As the
very least, it is clear that the Systematic group tend to come from an engineering
background and to be sufficiently happy with that culture or mode of operation to con-
tinue on with it. The Intuitive engineering majors (5 if subjects C and D are includ-
ed under the loose categorization) do not seem to remain so happy in that area. Their
work experience is much more variegated than that of the Systematics, with teaching
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Flgure 9
Subject Undergraduate major Work experience Myers-Brlggs
(Thinking/Feeling)
A
B
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
N
P
Q
R
S
T
Economics
Engineering
Information and
control systems
Production mana-
gement
Chemical Engineering
Mechanical engineering
French literature
Law
Philosophy, U.S.
studies
Economics
No data available
Engineering
Glass sciences
Mechanical engineering
Civil engineering
Nautical science
Electrical engineering
Engineering
No data available
Military Intelligence T
Teaching Math and F
Economics
Information systems F
design
Teaching USN F
Technical sales T
Technical writer T
Law trainee T
Sales, marketing T
staff
Market research T
teaching math
Sales representative F
No data available T
Construction engineer- T
ing
Engineering T
Computer hardware T
design
Construction engineering T
Project manager, construe- T
tion
Computer programming T
U.S. Coastguard T
No data available T
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and sales positions being the most frequent occupations.
The Myers-Briggs results correspond overall with the findings for the larger
sample. In particular, none of the 8 Systematic subjects are of the Feeling type,
while 4 of the Intultives are.
Summary
This experiment had two functions. The first was to provide a backward glance at
/
the accuracy of the method used to classify cognitive style in the main sample. The
second was more independent and qualitative, aimed at exploring the more general
habits and strategies of each cognitive style in problem-solving. Both aims seem to
have been reasonably met. The subjects selected as being Intuitive show consistent
characteristics and so do the Systematic ones. Moreover, these characteristics mesh
with the predictions made as to problem-solving behavior. They both flesh out the
findings of the other experiments and add a richer texture through the focus on oral
replies and on process rather than solutions. The more important aspects of the experi-
ment to be pointed to concern the subjects' responses as a unified whole. First, it
is apparent that the two groups differ meaningfully in their very use of language.
The transcripts of oral replies show distinctive features within each group. The Sys-
tematics all tend to be deliberative, sequential in thought and consciously organized.
The Intuitives tend far more to think aloud, to look for an organizing idea or approach
to shift from one topic to another, and to base answers on their own feelings rather
than on external validity such as logic. In concluding this analysis, the writer has
some slight regret that all the oral transcripts cannot be quoted directly - they
constitute a morass of data, which none the less, has a flavor that is in itself power-
ful evidence in support of the arguments of the study. It does seem worth ending
with two final quotations, of a Systematic and of an Intuitive subject's response to
the same question. They are fairly representative of the transcripts as a whole and
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do , it is felt here, display vividly the differences inherent in the two styles. If
the reader can accept that they are , in fact, representative, it should be clear
which is the Systematic and which the Intuitive subject and also that cognitive style
has a definite and distinctive impact on the whole problem-solving process.
The question involved in the transcripts is Number 11, the game theory situation
of twenty men locked in a room with a threatening assailant.
A. Subject N
"The problem for the twenty men seems to be that they should get toget-
her and act as a group because the group pressure of twenty people pit-
ted against the group pressure of one person is going to eventually sort
of intimidate that one person. The thing that I would suggest they do
is get together back in the corner and strategize about the assailant,
discover the particular reasons and circumstances xinder which they were
brought in and try to find out just what his plans are. Now they should
while they're doing this keep track of him, so that if he gets really
nervous about this kind of conversation, they can break it off. Then one
person should act as a spokesman and this person will kind of know who
he is in this kind of situation and tell the assailant that the group of
twenty don't really, er, want to do, try to make sure the assailant
looks at them as people he, the assailant, has to deal with and so that
the assailant doesn't look at them as threatening individuals. It's
very difficult to shoot a person that you think of as a person, but per-
haps, relatively easy to shoot a person that you think of as an obstruc-
tion or someone who's trying to make life difficult for you. The twenty
men should all stay on one side of the assailant so that he doesn't get
overly nervous and should walk up to him as a group and discuss with him
the reasons why he feels that he wants to shoot some of them and try to
calm him down and talk with him about what are his problems what are his
reasons for being upset in this situation. Now if they can get him to
talk about himself and his own difficulties perhaps they can relieve some
of the anxiety and tension, the disturbed feelings that he has. Perhaps,
he will forget the idea, break down, feel a release of tension and drop
the gun, if they're successful in this regard. In any event, when the
twenty of them are together it seems they certainly can get to him physi-
cally if they have to that it's going to be very difficult in fact for
him to kill al twenty , that the maximum he'll be able to do is kill one
or two of them as that person grabs at his gun, so that under these cir-
cumstances somebody could rush him, grab him and take the gun away. Now
perhaps, this sort of grouping around him is going to mkae him feel ner-
vous, make him feel that these people are a threat to him. If he shows
any signs like that at all them mineteen of them should go back into the
corner of the room and just one man should go out and talk with him and
try to appear very innocuous and unafraid of him, but at the same time
not a threat to him, and this one person should do the negotiating with
him and discuss with him his alternatives, point out to him that it's very
difficult for him to get any benefit from the killing of six people. The
main gist of the effort has to be in finding out what bothers the assailant
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"and why he is driven to wanting to kill people in the first place. It
would seem that there must be some sort of a disturbance either of a
mental kind in terms of his family background and home life situation
or a physical disturbance, brain tumor or something of this nature to
make him essentially go off his rocker. Alternatively the assailant
could be some sort of a criminal who's sort of looking for hostages or
could be in a penitentiary situation. If the assailant is insane, he
should be dealt with as an insane person and I'm not really familiar
with the psychiatric techniques which are used to subdue or calm people
who are in this situation but that was what I was suggesting in the
first part of this tape. If he's a criminal however, really a sane
person who's either trying to make an escape or who's caught in jail,
he really should be someone who can be appealed to on a rational basis.
It should be possible to show him on a rational basis killing won't
work.
"
B. Subject J
"when I read this the first time it reminded me of the Olympics. You
know, the Arabs and Israelis. He obviously can't kill all of them.
He's only got six bullets and once he runs out of bullets, he's dead.
So actually, he can really only kill five of them, because as soon as
he uses the sixth bullet he's had it. So.... gee, there's a one out of
four chance, five out of twenty that if I was there I'd be killed.
However, if we all stormed him, he'd probably get off two shots at the
most, so instead of waiting — also if you storm him there's less of a
chance that he can kill both of you. He could miss or he could just
hit you in the arm or something. There's no furniture. They're all
back in the comer, 70 feet. That's how many yards? Twenty yards.
You can go about 20 yards in about 3 seconds... I guarantee he couldn't
get off more than 2 or 3 shots. He'd just be firing into the crowd,
and firing into the crowd. .. there's a good chance he'd hit someone in
the leg or the stomach. Of course, I sure as hell wouldn't want to be
the guy up front .. .Hmmm. Everybody can talk without his hearing. The
hardest thing would be to convince everyone to do it, because if you
don't get everybody — well I guess you don't need everybody. If you
get ten guys. Of course, those 10 wouldn't want to do it unless every-
body else would... If they could break the light somehow and wait until
dark, then you'd have even a better chance. But I guess the chances
of breaking a light are pretty slim. You could take a shoe off and
throw it at it or something, I don't know. I guess the best way would
just be to sort of spread out and kind of come in and just start —
well I don't know .... I wonder if you could talk to him, psych him out
.... The circumstances are really important. I mean, you don't know
why he's in there. If he's, like, a suicidal person, then I don't think
he'd.... you know. But if he's the kind of person that robbed a bank or
something and he just got trapped in there with all these people. Then
it might pay to say 'now listen, you don't want to die and neither do
we, but if you start shooting the most you can kill is two or three.
Then, we're going to jump on you, torture you' or something. I guess
I'd try to reason with him first. If he wouldn't reason, you know, if
I could see that ....I guess first of all I'd talk with the group, fig-
ure out who was where, who wanted to sit there and take a chance and
get a feel for the group. And then I think maybe come up with two or
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"three people who'd want to be spokesmen and maybe the rest of the group
would be sort of out of it. And just have the two or three people sort
of talk to the guy, you know, see what happens. If you can talk him out
of it, good. If you can't, I say storm him with as many people as you
can because your chances of survival are far better that way than wait-
ing for him to shoot five people. I'd try that, (the light switch is
irrelevant). Well, I was thinking you'd don't know what the light situ-
ation is, if there are any windows. I mean, if there are no windows you
can just wait until it's dark, anything to increase your chances. You
might just, I might even try to take my shoes off and have everybody take
their shoes off — have everybody take their clothes off and throw them
at him, anything just divert his attention. .. .Maybe have everybody just
whistling, try to drive the guy batty. He knows as soon as those six are
gone.... It's not the kind of problem, it's easy for me to Monday morning
quarterback but I'm sure if I was in the situation I'd be scared stiff."
V. Conclusion - The Implications of Cognitive Style
With cognitive style, as with most aspects of personality, the injunction "Know
thyself" is a useful one. However, most managers - if the experiences with the student
samples are indicative - have a definite sense of how they themselves operate; because
of this the injunction needs to be extended to "Know thyself and know others". Some-
times trivial incidents can reflect important general events; one such recurrent in-
cident underlay many of the early ideas behind this study. These were the sometimes
amusing instances of two immeasurably competent individuals dismissing the other as
on the one side 'sloppy, doesn't know what he's talking about' and 'slow, pedantic
nitpicker'. The important point was not the frustration with the other, but the choice
of objection. It was easy to observe the casue of the irritations and later to direct-
ly relate them to cognitive style. For example, the combination of a very Systematic
CPA and an Intuitive organizational theorist working together on teaching materials
led to patterns of behavior in each that match the checklists of characteristics of
each style given earlier in this study. The patterns generate no friction where each
individual is working by himself; it is the conjunction that creates the mutual annoy-
ance. Much of this seems to lie in the mere process of articulation of an argument
or case. The CPA simply rejected the mode by which the other. Intuitive, individual
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reached a conclusion; when he attempted to evaluate that conclusion he had almost
to go back to the beginning and recast the line of argument. What was 'evidence' and
'proof' to the Intuitive, was not so to the Systematic and vice-versa — perhaps more
importantly, what was self -evident to the one was not so to the other, which led to
the dismissal of each other as stupid. A more costly mismatch in style can be il-
lustrated in relation to entrepreneurial partnerships. A fairly common pattern in new
businesses is for an individual with an 'idea' to start up a company and later find
that he needs a partner; often, the founder is Intuitive with a concept of what the
market needs and with a streak of originality that enabled him to identify an oppor-
tunity or a new product. Once the business is underway he may feel the strain of run-
ning day-to-day operations, particularly in the areas of finance and accounting. He
thus looks for a partner with the skills he lacks; he brings into the company a com-
ptroller who will tend to be precise where the founder was unorganized, will 'rational-
ize' operations etc. etc. If, as it is quite probable, the comptroller is a strong Sys-
tematic, one would predict that the combination of the two types, initially promising,
will end in divorce. They see the world very differently, their distinctive modes of
response and problem-solving will irritate in situations of time-pressure and crisis,
and they have little basis for sharing their individual insights. Quite obviously,
cognitive style is not the sole explanation in such a situation, but it does appear to
indicate why very capable individuals of equable temperament and cooperative natures
can find astonishing difficulty in working with each other. It is not enough to
label the problems as a 'conflict of personalities'.
In turning attention from incompatibility to compatibility, it is worth pointing
to an aspect of every manager's experience; in day-to-day activity, colleague rela-
tionships develop which are highly-valued by the manager, but which often are not
backed with personal friendship or social contacts. When the colleague leaves the co-
mpany or is transferred, the manager will feel regret but make no effort to keep up
the relationship. None the less, while it exists it is a strong one in the sense that
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the two will value the other's opinion, work, closely together and maintain an open-
ness to the other that allows them to argue together, share insights and seek out
each other's opinions. The literature on the subject of organization communication
tends to explain such relationships in social or interpersonal terms; these are ob-
viously relevant, but it seems very plausible that compatibility of thinking style
is also a factor of importance. Herman Witkin, whose model of field-independence is
the best known of all cognitive style paradigms, has found that in teacher-student
contacts, individuals recognize very quickly if they have the same style and will be
much here likely to develop a good relationship if they do.^-* The argument made here
parallels that of Witkin.
In the example given at the start of this section, the CPA and organizational
theorist were well aware of how they themselves operated, but either they did not
understand how the other did so or, even with understanding, they disdained his mode
of thinking. This study is essentially concerned with cognitive specialization; in-
dividuals who do not have a marked style are reasonably adaptive and can shift their
mode of response to some degree to fit either a new task or interaction with a dif-
ferent individual. The CPA in the example has an unusual and rigorous specialized
set of abilities and so too does the OB individual (OB: Organizational Behavior (ist),
to use a convenient abbreviation) . If one diagrams their abilities in the form of
an 'operating space' the result is analogous to a Venn diagram:
Figure 10
Systematic
I
r^c >- -X. f,.\
The area of intersection between the two circles is very small. Each of the two in-
dividuals can operate with problems or task-roles that are specialized in demands.
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For instance, given a problem where the information is well-defined and requires
precise evaluation and where there exists a coherent and articulable pain for deal-
ing with it, the CPA's operating space covers that type of problem (point XYZ in the
diagram). The OB type's does not. Qutie obviously, the CPA can provide the other
here with insights and aids he would otherwise lack. The central issue for the two
is how they can bridge the cognitive gap between them. Perhaps there is a degree of
specialization of style where dialogue becomes impossible. None the less, it seems
likely that the two can find some ways of building a 'meeting of minds'. Firstly,
they are more likely at least to listen to each other if they can recognize that
their own style is only one of several valid ways of thinking and not the sole 'logi-
cal one' .
There is, perhaps, a more contingent factor to be taken into account here, the
task-context itself. The idea of an operating space is useful; if the CPA and the
OB had been able to recognize the class of problem they were dealing with they might
have saved much effort - more accurately, if they had recognized the class of the
subproblem
,
the effort might have been saved; the distinction is important since most
problems that require working together over a period of time involve a sequence of
varying classes of subproblem. The problem in Exhibit 1, XYZ is one where the Intui-
tivemode, even if it does get a solution, is likely to be inefficient. The CPA has
justification for irritation where the OB tries to intuitively solve a problem that
requires only a few minutes of careful formalization to be easily dealt with. Simi-
larly, of course, the OB is understandably annoyed at the waste of time and energy
used up in trying to lay out a plan for a problem which demands initially at least a
wider set of horizons and an exploration of possible directions of analysis. Where
the two are sensitive to the problem itself, there can be a rich modulation of effort.
In particular, the Systematic can begin at the relevant point to close the problem,
to take the insights of the Intuitive and start to make a plan. At that point, the
Intuitive fades into the background and perhaps later uses his special mode of respon-
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se to test out and validate the Systematic' s plan by ranging over its implications
and trying out scenarios. This provides a complementarity in problem-solving that
can exploit the powerful though narrow specializations of both thinkers.
The major irritant of the strong Intuitive for the Systematic appears to be his
impulsiveness. The Intuitive will often jump in and try something and not complete
what he does. In a roomful of Intuitives this provides no strain. For the methodo-
logical Systematic there is immense annoyance in following consciously, as he needs
to do in his problem-solving mode, the tergiversations and random ramblings of the
Intuitive. It is not recommended that the Intuitive curb his innate response, only
that he be careful in not jumping in with his comment too early, but wait until it
fits more directly into the Systematic' s sequence. In addition, he can often ac-
complish what he wants by asking questions, by presenting his scenario, at the re-
levant stage, to the Systematic and asking how it 'fits' the letter's plan. This
has the merit of also making sure that the plan fits the problem and possible con-
ditions.
All these recommendations are of necessity somewhat relative and do not amount
to well-defined rules. Problem-solving is a process (though we may forget that in
focussing on 'answers') and one cannot provide neat rules for such a process, any
more than checklists on how to make friends and influence people have value other
than as broad guidelines. The recommendations given here are, however, strongly
relevant to managers. The more a successful manager specializes in a functional
area such as production or marketing, the more he becomes likely to lean on his style
and experience. This makes him increasingly insensitive to both differences in prob-
lems, other ways of dealing with problems or the value to him of thinking styles
that he finds uncomfortable to work with. Compartmentalization and departmentaliza-
tion in organizations develop through specialization of tasks; they are compounded
by specialization of style in the managers who occupy particular roles. This can be
very damaging indeed when a manager Is transferred or promoted if he takes with him
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the same response to information and the same mode of arriving at decisions, without
recognizing that the class of problem he now must deal with has changed. The first
two recommendations provided here seem most helpful for such a manager. If he is
aware of his own operating space, he will be better able to assess his new reality
and how to react to it. He will also be able to pick assistants and advisers who
can complement his mode of style in the ways most likely to fit his new environment.
The recommendations given for the individual manager apply with few changes to
the context of information systems and decision aids; the manager should:
1) know his own style
2) amplify his own style through the use of information systems and
decision aids
3) be aware of the impact of his own style on his use of such aids and
on the design of them
Many of the conclusions to be drawn concerning how managers use informational
aids follow directly from the preceding discussion. In particular, the interactions
between the designer of computer models of MIS and the client-manager are often a
dramatic clash between strong, distinctive styles. The discussion of the interaction
of the individual manager with others of different cognitive styles could well have
been extended to include the question of the Management of Expertise and their cog-
nitive style. Staff experts are almost, by definition, very specialized, both in terms
of their area of expertise and their cognitive style. How to make use of their very
nongeneral skills is at times a painful problem to the general manager, as the ongoing
debate about the use of management science in organizations shows.
About the time that all the experiments in this study had been completed an inter-
esting proposal, "A program for research on management information systems", appeared
in a paper by Mason and Mitroff in Management Science (January 1973) . This paper does
not use any concepts of cognitive style, but none the less, argues in similar directions
to this study, including, coincidently , the suggestion that the Myers-Briggs Indica-
tor be used to classify psychological type in relation to information systems.
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Mason and Mitroff provide a compact definition of an information system. It 'consists
of at least one PERSON of a certain PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE who faces a PROBLEM within some
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT for which he needs EVIDENCE to arrive at a solution (i.e., to
select some course of action) and that the evidence is made available through some
24
mode of PRESENTATION.' Mason and Mitroff suggest, though without providing any
experimental data, that management information systems tend to be designed by Thinking-
Sensation types (these categories are those of the Myers-Briggs Indicator) . The whole
process of implementing information systems, especially those that are computer-based,
requires the formalization and methodological focus on plans that is the main char-
acteristic of the Systematic thinker. As Mason and Mitroff point out, 'the designers
of MIS have tended to project (or mistake) their dominant psychological type (Thinking
-
Sensation) onto that of their clients.' This, restated in terms of cognitive style,
is the central issue here, too. If the designer regards information as external, fix-
ed and to be processed in the Systematic mode, rather than as 'evidence', then the
resulting MIS will tend to be unhelpful to the Intuitive. There is substantial evi-
dence that it is the Systematic feature of both information systems and management
science techniques that has made their implementation less easy than anticipated in
the early roseate flush of what Heany has called the Operation Researcher's march un-
25der the banner of 'Have technique- will travel'.'
The whole topic of cognitive style eind computer-based decision aids is discussed
in detail in other papers by this author and his colleagues. 2° It is, perhaps, the
most direct application of the cognitive style concept. The Management Scientist
tends to be a Systematic par excellence, whose especial skill is the provision of
techniques, the formalization of problem-solving methodologies and the building of ex-
plicit models. The failure to recognize his own cognitive style seems to be a fre-
quent and expensive limitation among even highly competent quantitative analysts.
The final area of management practice where cognitive style is of substantial
relevance has to an extent been partly covered in the preceding sections. It concerns
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the design of small group or project teams to work together on a complex, multi-
phase task; examples of such tasks are commonplace - capital investment evaluation,
a computer or aerospace project, etc. There is a natural tendency for organizations
to assign responsibility and leadership roles that are intended to hold for the whole
length of the project task. In teams that work well together, however, roles tend
to be more fluid, with each individual's expertise being tacitly accepted and adjust-
ments made at various stages of the ongoing project to highlight a particular person's
contributions . The recommendations to be made here draw very strongly on the con-
cepts of differentiation and integration developed by Lawrence and Lorsch.^^
Extremes of cognitive style are likely to be found in specialized, differentiated
28
task-roles. As was suggested in relation to the management scientist's skills, such
cognitive differentiation is potentially of immense value - given the integrative me-
chanisms essential to provide coordination and cooperation. In terms of cognitive
style, which is a feature, but not the full picture of the differentiations of func-
tion, goals and time horizons Lawrence and Lorsch found in their field research, the
integration process is partly one of translation. A hypothesis to be tested in a
later research effort is that integrators will not generally have a pronounced cog-
nitive style, but will be 'switchers' who can adjust their problem-solving process to
the demands of the situation; the situation includes both the problem itself and the
style of others with whom the switcher is to interact.
In a complex project the task will, at some stages, be best suited to a System-
atic and at others to an Intuitive response. The most fruitful results seem likely
to come from groups that include both a mixture of cognitive specialists and the nec-
essary translators. The recommendations can be made specific through the example of
a large-scale EDP project. The decision to 'put', say, capital asset accounting on
the computer may presage several years of effort involving some dozen personnel. The
first stage, of systems design, really requires, and often does not get, an open-ended
approach to the global features of the problem. This involves an almost aesthetic

-52-
sense of shaping the system, creating a lucid abstraction out of the various in-
puts, necessary outputs, routings, and constraints of the organizational activity
which constitute the environment of the computer system. This first stage clearly
requires the varying, uncommitted hypotheses-testing of the Intuitive style, but in
the second stage of the project, these characteristics are a liability; the detailed
laying out, even at a general levei, of the computer specifications requires a Sys-
tematic mode. The third stage, the detailed development of the computer programs
requires even stronger Systematic skills, particularly in the area of program 'de-
bugging'. Once the programs have been written and tested out, however, the Intui-
tive style again has useful virtues. The system as a whole, not as a set of indiv-
idual programs, needs to be checked against the data of day-to-day operations, using
29
the hypothetical scenarios the Intuitive naturally employs.
A systems analyst or programmer will be involved in all these stages to some ex-
tent. Moreover, the stages overlap; the Intuitive designer cannot think through the
approach to master file up-dating without at least some attention to file structure
and size. However, it is apparent that the stages and sub-tasks require essentially
different styles. The skill that leads to a strong overall sense of the system de-
sign is ill-fitted to precisely focusing without preconceptions on a small subroutine
in a program. It can be unequivocally said that Systematics usually design very
poor systems and that Intuitves will need substantial time before they debug their
programs. But, and the example can be extended to marketing, finance, accounting
etc. , there tends to be an assumption that specialization is functional not cognitive.
While that has to be true to an extent, it can be misleading; the computer 'special-
ist' will have distinctive skills, but it is rare to the point of probable nonexist-
ence for him to have substantial flair for all the stages of a computer effort. None
the less, a common feature in organizations' EDP departments is the 'promotion' of
an experienced, highly competent systems programmer to systems designer. Usually
his Systematic skills are not transferable; he will impose on the design process a
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planning that often ignores the unique features of the situation, features that
tend to become pitfalls.
In successful computer projects - and these are more frequent than general mana-
gers may suggest - the individuals involved generally recognize this aspect of their
own specialization. Here the project 'head' will be the formal leader and spokes-
man, but task leadership will shift over time in relation to the demands of the
situation. The example is a special case, drawn largely from the author's main area
of experience. Its implications, however, are general. In the design of work teams
it may often be desirable to deliberately make use of specializations of style. It
is also essential to provide for modulation of leadership and of responsibility. In
the scenario above, the whole balance and product of the effort will be altered if,
say the Intuitive as 'Chief Senior Systems Analyst' maintains task leadership through-
out the project.
In some situations a particular project obviously will not need either a high
level of specialization or specific styles. For example a project team working to
bring a new plant on stream can well forego (perhaps should at all costs do so) the
inclusion of an Intuitive style among its cognitive repetoire. Here the argument
comes full circle. The effectiveness of problem-solving in organizations, at an in-
dividual or project level at least, will depend on the fit between task-role and cog-
nitive style.
Specific areas where cognitive style is relevant to managers and administrators
have been described here. Rather than focus narrowly on particular aspects of
problem-solving and decision-making, the final recommendations are more broad in
scope. The model of cognitive style is intended as a paradigm, in Thomas Kuhn's
sense of the term in the context of scientific practice.-^ As such, it competes
with many other paradigms of the decision process. It is a synthetic model and no
doubt is incomplete, even inadequate. However, its intended value is specifically
as a paradigm which, when adopted, gives a new focus for looking at existing prob-
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lem areas, points to new problems and methodologies for research and as a whole,
provides an organizing framework. For the practising manager, this framowork mav
amount to a relatively simple conceptual scheme which allows him to understand his
own and others' behavior and to be able to predict the events and outcomes of the
decision process more easily. For the academic. It is hoped that the main concern
here is convincing, to shift attention in the study of decs ion-making to the rela-
tivistic, contingent features of actual human information-processing. There are
several other models of cognitive style that have substantial theoretical and ex-
perimental support. The main aim of this study is to establish a perspective; cog-
nitive style exists and is relevant to our understanding of how we make decisions.
That understanding, at a descriptive level, Is the essential first step towards
prescriptions for management practice.

NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Keen, P.G.W., "The Implications of Cognitive Style for Individual Decision-
Making", unpublished doctoral dissertation, Hairvard Graduate School of
Business Administration, 1973.
2. Newell, A., Shaw, J.C, and Simon, H.A., "Elements of a Theory of Human
Problem-Solving", 1958
3. Feigenbaum, E.A. , and Feldman, J., "Computers and Thought, 1963
4. See Keen, op. cit.. Chapter 2 passim and Botkin, J. A., "An Intuitive Com-
puter System", unpublished doctoral dissertation. Harvard Graduate School
of Business Administration, 1973
5. Broadbent, D.E., "Communication and Perception", 1958. An excellent sum-
mary of research in this area by Broadbent and others is given in Norman,
D.A.
,
"Memory and Attention", 1969
6. Miller, G.A., "The Magical Number Seven Plus or Minus Two", 1956
7. Guilford, J. P., "Personality", 1959. Hudson has expanded on this model
in a witty, elegant book. Contrary Imaginations , 1966
8. Zangwill, "The Consequences of Brain Damage", 1970
9. Altemeyer, L. , "Education in the Arts and Sciences", Carnegie-Mellon, 1966
10. See Flavell, "Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget", 1963
11. An excellent summary of this problem is given by Meehl, P.E. and Rosen, A.E.,
"Antecedent Probability and the Efficiency of Psychometric Signs", Pattern
Cutting Scores, 1955
12. See Keen, op. cit
.
, Chapter 5

-2-
Notes and References (continued)
13. Myers, I.B., "The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator", 1962. This manual is
meticulous in its explanation of the theory and methodology underlying
the Indicatory and also reports a number of studies using it. All
quotations and examples in the following discussion came from Myer's
manual unless otherwise indicated.
14. Strong, E.K. and Campbell, D.P., "Manual for Strong Vocational Interest
Blank", 1966
15. Keen, o£^. cit
.
, Chapter 5, page 52-54
16. See Keen, op . cit
.
, Chapter 6 for a more detailed justification of these
and later assertions.
17. See especially, Newell, A. and Simon, H.A. , "Human Problem-Solving"
18. Gagn^, R.M. and Smith, E.C., "A Study of the Effects of Verbalization on
Problem-Solving", 1962
19. Botkin, op . cit.
20. See discussion above, page 14
21. Botkin, op. cit.
22. See Botkin, op . cit
.
,
derived formal flow-charts from his subjects' proto-
cols. The differences in structure - and to an extent coherence - between
his Intuitive and Systematic subjects' verbal protocols are highlighted
by this process.
23. Witkin, H.A. , "The Role of Cognitive Style in Academic Performance and Teacher-
Student Relations", 1972

-3-
Notes and References (continued)
24. Mason, R.O.and Mitroff, I.J., "A Program for Research on MIS", 1973
25. Heany, D.H., "Is TIMS Talking to Itself", 1965
26. See Bibliography: Keen, McKenney, and Botkin
27. Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W., "Orgainzation and Environment", 1967
28. See Keen, op. cit. , Chapter 3 passim
29. See Keen, P.G.W. and McKenney, J.L., "Implications of Cognitive Style for
the Design of Analytic Models", 1973. J
30. Kuhn, T.S., "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions", 1962

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Altemeyer, L. , Education in the Arts and Sciences (unpublished doctoral dis-
sertation, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh 1966)
2. Botkin, J.W., An Intuitive Computer System; A Cognitive Approach to the Manage-
ment Learning Process (unpublished doctoral dissertation. Harvard Business
School, 1973)
3. Broadbent, D.E., Communication and Perception (Pergamon, New York, 1958)
4. Broadbent, D.E., Decision and Stress (Academic Press, New York, 1971)
5. Broverman, D.M. , "Dimensions of Cognitive Style" (Journal of Personality, vol. 28
1960)
6. Doktor, R.H., Development and Mapping of Certain Cognitive Styles of Problem-
Solving (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1969)
7. Doktor, R.H., and Hamilton, W.F. , "The Acceptance of Operations Research Pro-
posals" (University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1971)
8. Feigenbaum, E.A. and Feldman, J. (ed.)» Computers and Thought (McGraw-Hill, New
York, 1963)
9. Flavell, J.H., The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget
,
(Reinhold, New York
1963)
10. French, J.W., Ekstrom, R.B., and Price, L.A. , Manual for Kit of Reference Tests
for Cognitive Factors (Educational Testing Service, Princeton, N.J., 1963)
11. Gagn4, R.M. and Smith, E.C. Jr., "A Study of the Effects of Verbalization on
Problem-Solving" (Journal of Experimental Psychology, No. 63, 1962)
12. Guilford, J. P., Psychometric Methods (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1954)

-2-
Bibliography (continued)
13. Guilford, J. P., Personality (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1959)
14. Heany, D.H. , "Is TIMS Talking to Itself" (Management Science vol. 12, No. 4, 1965)
15. Hudson, L,, Contrary Imaginations (Methuen, London, 1966)
16. Huysmans , J., The Implementation of Operations Research (Wiley-Interscience, New
York, 1970)
17. Keen, P.G.W., "The Implications of Cognitive Style for the Design of Computer
Models" (Harvard Business School, working paper HBS 72-43)
18. Keen, P.G.W. and McKenney, J.L. , "The Evolution of an Experimental Design for the
Study of Cognitive Style" (Harvard Business School, working paper, HBS 73-4)
19. Keen, P.G.W. and McKenney, J.L. , "The Implications of Cognitive Style for the
Design of Analytic Models" (Sloan working paper No. 694-74, MIT)
20. Kuhn, T.S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago University Press,
Chicago, 1962)
21. Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W., Organization and Environment: Managing Differ-
entiation and Integration (Harvard Business School, Division of Research,
Boston, 1967)
22. Mason, R.O. and Mitroff, I.J. , "A Program for Research on MIS" (Management Science
1973, vol. 19 [5])
23. Meehl, P.E. and Rosen, A., "Antecedent Probablility and the Efficiency of Psycho-
metric Signs, Patterns or Cutting Scores" (Psychological Bulletin, vol. 52,
1955)
24. Miller, G.A., "The Magical Number Seven Plus or Minus Two" (Psychological Review,
No. 63, 1956)

-3-
Bibliography (continued)
25. McKenney, J.L. and Keen, P.G.W. , "How Managers Minds Work" (Harvard Business
Review, May 197A [in press])
26. Nelson, K.H.
,
"A Bibliography of Cognitive Style Research" (Harvard Business
School, working paper HBS 73-21, 1973)
27. Norman, D.A. , Memory and Attention; an Introduction to Human Information-
Processing (Wiley, New York, 1969)
28. Shouksmith, G. Intelligence, Creativity and Cognitive Style (Wiley, New York,
1970)
29. Strong, E.K. Jr., Vocational Interests Eighteen Years After College (University
of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1955)
30. Strong, E.K. Jr. and Campbell, D.P. , SVIB Manual
.
(Stanford University Press,
Stanford, 1966)
31. Zangwill, O.L., "The Consequences of Brain Damage in the Ecology of Human In-
telligence" edited by Hudson, L. (Penguin, London 1970)

APPENDIX A: Samp l e Questiong from the Co.:;nitive Style
Test Battery
Under the conditions by which ETS makes tests available, no
quotations may be given from the body of the tests, only from the
Examples the subjects are shown prior to the test itself. These ex-
amples tend to be fairly simple; however, illustrate the format of
the tests.
PAPE3^ FOLDING TEST
In this test you are to imagine the folding and unfolding of pieces of
paper. In each problem in the test there are seme figures drawn at the left
of a vertical line and there are others drawn at the right of the line. The
figures at the left represent a square piece of paper being folded, and the
last of these figures has one or two small circles drawn on it to show where
the paper has been punched. Each hole is punched through all the thicknesses
of paper at that point . One of the five figures at the right of the vertical
line shows where the holes will be when the paper is completely unfolded. You
are to decide which one of these figures is correct and draw an X through that
figure
.
Now try the sample problem below. (In this problem only one hole was
punched in the folded paper
.
)
L.
B E
L.
The correct answer to the sample problem above is C and so it should have
been marked with an X. The figures below show how the paper was folded and
why C is the correct answer.
Q
I
^
I I
I I
^
-^
I 1
:^
o

Intuitive
VERIVJ. lUZZLES
Items 1 to 18 consist of word pairs. Think of a third word which is In '
one way or another related to the two words in each item. You are given
the first letter of a suitable answer word. Fill in the blank with the
remainins letters of the answer word. In some of the items you may select
a word that has two different nicanincs and is related to one word by one
meanins and to the other word by another meaning. Possible ajiswers are
given below to two sample pairs of words.
a. piano lock • K EY
b. drop autumn ' F A UL
Items 19 to ?h consist of* sentences each of which contain two blank spaces.
Your task is to fill the two blank spaces In each sentence with the some
word. Ihat is, one word ur.ed twice will give you a meanincful sentence.
Here is an ex^Tjiipic
:
(a) My latest xxH--^<yA../-/v\<aXc.o-v'J is that the squadron will fly
past ><^ ^-r^^-.a^^'-ovL/ at six o'clock this evening.
6
Notice that, although both blanks are filled with the some letters in the
same order, the meaning is different, and that in one blank in the sentence
the letters are divided to form two words
.
SCRAMBLED WORDS
Each of the following groups of four letters would,- if rearranged,
speUL a common English word.
eboy e b^ y
vyne v y n/e)
t^h atoha
The first group of letters, eboy
,
when rearranged spells obey . To
indicate this, the firso letter of the unscrambled word, o, has been
encircled in the column of spaced letters on the right. Similarly, the
letters in vyne can be made to spell envy
,
and so the letter e has been
circled. Tor.a is cain and so o is encircled.

CHOOSHIG A PATH
This Is a test of your ability to choose a correct path from among
several choices . In the picture below is a box with dots marked S ajid
F. S is the starting point and F is the finish. You are to follow the
line from S, through the circle at the top of the picture and back to F.
rOi
S F
In the problems in this test there will be five such boxes
.
Only one box will have a line from the S, through the circle, and
back to the F in the same box. Dots on the lines show the only places
where connections can be made between lines. If lines meet or cross
where there is no dot , there is no connection between the lines. Now
try this example. Show which box has the line through the circle by
blackening the space at the lower right of that box.
lOi
S F J ^
fiM
hfm
J]
D
n
The first box is the one which has the line from S, through the
circle, and back to F. The space lettered A has therefore been blackened,
Each diagram in the test has only one box which has a line through
the circle and back to the F. Some lines are wrong because they lead to
a dead end. Some lines are wrong because they come back to the box with-
out going through the circle. Some lines are wrong because they lead to
other boxes that do not have lines going through the circle.

APPENDIX B Problem Cafeteria
1. A goat is tethered to the edge of a circular field by a fixed post.
The field is 100 yards in diameter. Calculate the length of rope
that will allow the goat to graze over exactly half the area of the
field, (an explanation of the method of calculation is an accepta-
ble answer; you need not do all the arithmetic. )
goat can graze over
the shaded area
>o&^
2. You are superintendent of schools in Transylvania, Ohio. You
have to decide on a policy issue and have announced that you will
support the public opinion on the matter. You took a poll of
teachers, school administrators and parents, with the following
results:
Teachers Administrators Parents
Pro 25 20 10
Anti 5 10 20
Don't know 15
a) What is your decision?
b) What would be your guess as to the nature of the policy issue
involved?
3. Refute the arguments below (implicit or explicit)
a) "is this the beef broth or chicken broth, waiter?"
"Can't you tell by the taste?"
"No.
"
"Well then, what difference does it make?"
b) There cannot be any real or basic mental differences between
men and women, for both with men and women there are far
wider differences in the particular group than between the

average man and the average woman.
4. To what would you ascribe the recent fashion for wide ties?
5. Consider the following numbers: 276,276 591,591 112,112.
All are divisible by 13. Prove this is true for all numbers of
this form.
List as many possible uses as you can for these two objects
when they are used together. Provide a brief explanation of
the method and purpose of use in each case.
7. The diagram below shows the level of unemployment in Germany
between 1926 and 1934, together with the number of Nazi mem-
bers of Parliament in those years. Discuss the hypothesis that
the distress in Germany during the world slump created a mood
of desperation that helped the rise of the Nazi party.
J^- •12.- Ko of ^C^.7,1 M,f.s.
^^A6 27 :^^ Z9 5t> 3r 3i 33

8. A flying saucer has landed in your back garden. Aliens emerge.
They are blue, with six limbs, four feet high and encased in
space suits. How would you communicate with them? (Note:
you have no idea if they are friendly; your strategy should in-
clude the consideration of the snub-nosed rods in their "hands").
9. The words on the page below can be arranged in ten groups with
the members of each group forming a scale. You are to label
each word using a number for the group of which it is part and
a letter showing its position within the group, "a" being the
lowest, "b" the second lowest, etc. The classes do not neces-
sarily contain the same number of members. An example is
shown below for a small list of words:
Example le

10. Fill out the square below so that it forms words reading across
all the rows and down all the columns. You may use any
English word that is not a proper noun (names of people, cities
etc) and is in polite usage. In the example below, the square is
half-completed - 'LOOK' and 'LAKE' across and 'OVAL' and
'KEEP' down. However, the square will be impossible to finish
since there is no word 'OxKx' nor can a word be found for the
first column 'LxLx' that will mesh with the fourth row 'xLxP'.
Example
u

13. Describe a bicycle, in terms that are absolutely unambiguous
and precise. (To say it has 'two wheels and a chain' permits
the following interpretation:)
14. Design a ceiling that will be cool in summer and warm in win-
ter. No auxiliary aids, such as electricity, a heating system
etc, are permitted.
15. The following message is in a simple code. Decipher it.
VEY CO XTS XCMS BEF IDD KEEJ MSV XE A EMS XE
XTS ICJ EB XTS NIFXQ

16, The diagram below shows the ships involved in the Battle of
Trafalgar. Describe the British attack on the Franco-Spanish
fleet. What was the French plan?
//>«* \
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